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CERN for the beneﬁt of the CMS Collaboratioa b s t r a c t
The electronics used in the data readout and triggering system for the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS)
experiment at the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) particle accelerator at CERN are exposed to high
radiation levels. This radiation can cause permanent damage to the electronic circuitry, as well as
temporary effects such as data corruption induced by Single Event Upsets. Once the High Luminosity
LHC (HL-LHC) accelerator upgrades are completed it will have ﬁve times higher instantaneous
luminosity than LHC, allowing for detection of rare physics processes, new particles and interactions.
Tests have been performed to determine the effects of radiation on the electronic components to be
used for the Endcap Muon electronics project currently being designed for installation in the CMS
experiment in 2013. During these tests the digital components on the test boards were operating with
active data readout while being irradiated with 55 MeV protons. In reactor tests, components were
exposed to 30 years equivalent levels of neutron radiation expected at the HL-LHC. The highest total
ionizing dose (TID) for the muon system is expected at the innermost portion of the CMS detector, with
8900 rad over 10 years. Our results show that Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) components selected
for the new electronics will operate reliably in the CMS radiation environment.
& 2012 CERN. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment [1] is one of
the two large general-purpose experiments at the Large Hadron
Collider (LHC). The purpose of this experiment is to understand
the mechanism of electroweak symmetry breaking responsible
for generating masses of particles and search for evidence of new
physics, such as supersymmetry and extra dimensions. The CMS
detector is one of the most advanced particle detectors ever built,
and is comprised of several distinct systems. These include the
silicon tracker, electromagnetic calorimeter, hadronic calorimeter,
super-conducting solenoid and muon chambers. Working
together, these systems identify particles as well as measure their
energy and momenta.
In order to maximize the amount of analyzable data, the beam
intensity of LHC will be increased, leading to ﬁve times higher
data rate in CMS. With this forthcoming High Luminosity LHC
(HL-LHC) accelerator upgrade, the Cathode Strip Chamber (CSC)
muon detectors [2] in the CMS endcap will require newn.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND electronics to handle the increased rate while maintaining high
data collection efﬁciency.
The increased rate of collisions will also raise the radiation
level experienced by the CMS data readout and trigger electronics.
Such exposure results in both cumulative effects and Single Event
Upsets (SEUs) that degrade the performance of silicon circuits.
The electronic components used in building the new CSC data
readout and trigger system must be designed to reliably handle the
high data rate while operating in a high radiation environment.
Therefore it is necessary to determine which commercial
electronic components are safe for high luminosity operation in
the CMS environment, and this initial study addresses the most
critical concerns in a series of tests that were carried out in the
Radiation Effects Facility at Texas A&M University (TAMU) Cyclo-
tron Institute and at the TAMU Nuclear Science Center (NSC). The
K500 cyclotron at TAMU provides a proton beam with 55 MeV
energy, while the reactor at the NSC provides neutrons with
energy up to a few MeV. A similar study was made elsewhere [3]
in 2001 to evaluate the components currently used by the CSC
system in the ﬁrst phase of LHC running.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2,
we describe the components of the new electronics for the CSC
system. In Section 3, we review the expected CMS radiation levels.
The radiation testing setups for digital and non-digital componentslicense.
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Sections 5 and 6, respectively.2 We distinguish digital parts by their fundamental function, in that they
primarily handle binary information data, although in some cases they may be
mixed internally with analog elements.
3 Full TID/displacement damage testing for digital components is planned for
a future study.2. Design considerations for new cathode strip chamber
electronics
The CSCs are a critical component of CMS that are used to
identify and measure momentum of muons passing through the
detector in the most forward region. The electronics used to
collect CSC data must be capable of handling the high data rate
and withstand the radiation environment in the CMS endcap.
New electronics are being designed to replace the existing
electronics for the innermost region of the CSC system, speciﬁ-
cally the 36 ‘‘ME1/1’’ chambers on each endcap. The design
includes improvements in data transmission and logic capability
to ensure efﬁcient performance.
There are three primary components of the ME1/1 CSC
electronics being replaced; Cathode Front End Boards (CFEB),
Trigger Motherboards (TMB) and Data Motherboards (DMB).
These last two types are custom VME boards [4] that operate in
an electronics crate a few meters away from the CSCs to which
they are connected. All of these boards are constructed using
Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) electronic components such as
FPGAs, voltage regulators, etc. The CFEBs provide digitized strip
data from a CSC; the TMB receives a coarse sampling of this data
to perform fast pattern matching and generates a signal to trigger
the readout of the detector when it determines that a muon track
has passed through the CSC. When that trigger signal is received
by the CFEBs, the fully digitized muon track data is sent to the
DMB, and then on to the CMS central data acquisition and storage
system. The continued high level of efﬁciency in the system
depends upon implementation of new algorithms in these boards,
which requires improvements such as new, powerful FPGAs and
new optical data links in order to handle the increased rate
of data.
Maintaining high efﬁciency in the system also requires
increased segmentation of the chamber electronics. In the current
conﬁguration of CSCs, each of the innermost (and the highest
rate) muon chambers carry ﬁve CFEBs, which are read out via
copper cables. In the new design there will be seven new high-
performance ‘‘Digital CFEBs’’ per chamber, which will reduce the
duty factor for each board, eliminate dead-time, and improve
processing efﬁciency. Geometrical constraints make large copper
cables unsuitable for this expansion to seven CFEBs, and optical
links are the only viable readout alternative. Furthermore,
improved logic capability is required for all three board types to
handle the additional data channels; this is addressed by utilizing
modern FPGAs with increased logic and memory resources.
Radiation effects must be considered in the design process as
these can cause electronics malfunctions. The most signiﬁcant
effects to consider in the CMS endcap fall into two general
categories: single event effects and cumulative effects. Single
event effects can occur as a Single Event Upset (SEU) or as a
latchup condition. SEUs are transient disruptions in digital circuits,
causing no permanent damage; they are easily recoverable by
simply writing or resetting the logic registers. However, a high rate
of such errors can cause unacceptable levels of dead time and reduce
efﬁciency of the system, so it is important to quantify the rate of
SEUs expected for each component.
Unlike an SEU, a latchup condition can cause permanent chip
failure. Latchup is generally characterized by a large increase in
current drawn by a chip, and the subsequent overheating can
burn out elements in the silicon. Occurrences such as this would
require a time consuming intervention to replace the damaged
parts, so it is important to design the CSC electronics withcomponents that are not susceptible to latchup in the CMS endcap
environment.
Cumulative effects are permanent incremental damage attrib-
uted to total ionizing dose (TID) or displacement damage, which
degrades the performance of silicon circuits over time [5]. Several
components were tested in this study with different manufactur-
ing technologies, and there are inherent differences in their
susceptibility to cumulative effects. This study makes no attempt
to distinguish between TID and displacement damage failures, but
the ﬁnal results on performance will be used to determine which
components are likely to survive the radiation environment in the
CMS endcap. Any COTS components found to be unsatisfactory for
any reason will not be used in the new design.
Single event effects are caused by hadronic interactions in the
silicon that change the logical state of a digital circuit.2 In the CMS
endcap environment, at least 90% of these are caused by neutrons
with energy above 20 MeV [6]. The authors in Ref. [6] note that
for energy above 20 MeV, the upset susceptibility in silicon is
equivalent for protons and neutrons. Thus, for digital compo-
nents, both TID/displacement damage as well as SEU and latchup
susceptibility can be evaluated at the same time using a cyclotron
beam that provides protons with energy greater than 20 MeV.
However, for the non-digital components in the CSC system the
biggest concern is TID/displacement damage, so exposure to
neutrons with energy around 1 MeV from a nuclear reactor is
largely sufﬁcient as a measure of their radiation tolerance.
The measurements made in this study show the impact of
SEUs in different components; e.g. most errors in the optical
receivers are transient, affecting only a single data word with
little overall signiﬁcance, but a complex component like an FPGA
may require a reset for SEU recovery, and this causes dead time.
Information about the SEUs rates and the impact of any recovery
action are combined for use as input in determining where
mitigation is required in the system. These factors are discussed
individually for each part later in the description of test results.
Survivability is also important, and the requirements for this
are discussed further in the next section. However, TID and
displacement damage results for digital components are not
included here, as the ﬂux of the TAMU cyclotron was not
sufﬁcient to accumulate signiﬁcant dose.3 Similarly, the non-
digital parts were not tested for SEU sensitivity due to the large
sample of initial candidates; however, the best candidates deter-
mined in this study will be subject to additional power-on tests in
the future to verify their tolerance to SEUs as well as cumulative
effects.3. CSC radiation level In CMS
ME1/1 CSCs are the innermost chambers within CMS and are
exposed to the highest rate of radiation, largely from neutrons.
Fig. 1 shows the simulated energy spectrum of neutrons crossing
the ME1/1 region. Fig. 2 shows how the neutron ﬂuence in the
endcap region is expected to vary with distance from the beam
line. In the area of highest neutron ﬂux, the total ﬂuence for
neutrons with energy E4100 keV is about 6 1011 cm2 [7], and
the TID is 1780 rad over 10 years of normal LHC operation.
However, for HL-LHC these rates are expected to be ﬁve times
higher, as summarized in Table 1. These data form the baseline for
determining the radiation tolerance of the CSC electronics.
Fig. 1. Energy spectrum of neutron exposure for the innermost chambers of the
CSC system, based on simulations from the ﬁrst phase of LHC operation [7].
Fig. 2. Expected neutron ﬂuence in the Station 1 region of the CMS endcap for the
ﬁrst phase of LHC operation, shown as a function of the distance from the beam
line [7].
Table 1
Summary of expected neutron exposure in the
ME1/1 region of the CMS endcap for 10 years of
HL-LHC operation.
Ten year HL-LHC exposure in ME1/1
20 MeV neutron ﬂuence 2.71011 n/cm2
1 MeV neutron ﬂuence 3.01012 n/cm2
Total ionizing dose 8.9 krad
4 These digital parts are primarily CMOS components that should be less
sensitive to damage at the moderate levels of radiation exposure expected at HL-
LHC. However, the beam ﬂux available in this study was not sufﬁcient to prove
their survivability, so the TID/displacement damage tolerance must be fully
evaluated with additional testing.
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Radiation tests were performed separately for digital and non-
digital components at the TAMU cyclotron and the NSC to determine
their radiation tolerance. The testing facilities, equipment and setup
are discussed for both digital and non-digital components in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. A special distinction is made for
digital components as they have a signiﬁcant susceptibility to SEU
errors in data handling and control logic.
4.1. Digital components
The proposed CSC electronics replacement introduces several
new digital devices to the system that require testing. These
include the Xilinx Virtex 6 FPGAs, the Finisar duplex opto-coupler,Reﬂex Photonics Snap12 simplex receiver and transmitter opto-
couplers, and the TI SN74CB3T bus exchange level shifter.
A printed circuit board containing these components was devel-
oped and assembled (Fig. 3) as a test bed for the measurements of
radiation tolerance. During the board design, special attention
was given to the location of the parts on the board, allowing
sufﬁcient space for a collimated beam to irradiate each compo-
nent one-by-one with no overlap.
In this study the digital components were tested for SEU
sensitivity.4 SEUs are caused primarily by neutrons with energy
above 20 MeV, and the ﬂuence of such neutrons in the ME1/1 region
of the CMS endcap is expected to be 2:7 1011 cm2 over 10 years
of HL-LHC running. However, for the purpose of this test it is only
necessary to observe enough SEUs to make a statistically signiﬁcant
measurement of the SEU cross-sections. To accomplish this, the total
number of observed operational errors for each component were
counted (regardless of mechanism) while they were exposed in a
controlled proton beam. These functional SEU cross-section mea-
surements are then used to evaluate the SEU sensitivity for each part
and determine the level of error mitigation that may be required.
The TAMU cyclotron provided a 55 MeV proton beam with a
ﬂux as high as 3 107 cm2 s1, and uniform across the 1.5 in.
diameter beam spot. The ﬂux measurements were made using
system of scintillation counters and a Faraday cup providing a
precision better than 1%. A movable platform was used to support
the TMB mezzanine test boards in perpendicular orientation with
respect to the beam line, and programmable stops were set for
the location of each device under test (DUT) to ensure alignment
in the beam. Two samples were tested for each of the digital COTS
components planned for use in the new CSC electronics.
System checks were performed just before irradiating each board
to verify that the power was stable and the SEU error monitoring
system (described below) was operational. Beam intensity for each
DUT began with a base level ﬂux of 1 107 cm2 s1. The SEU rate
was monitored during the ﬁrst few minutes of each DUT exposure,
and the beam ﬂux was adjusted as needed to attain a suitable rate of
SEUs, typically up to 10 per minute. Each DUT was exposed for 45–
90 min in the beam. Power supply currents were monitored for
signs of latchup during exposure.
A sophisticated error monitoring system was developed, using
custom ﬁrmware and software, in order to detect the occurrence of
SEUs and to reliably identify the exact element that failed among the
several different digital components mounted on the TMB mezza-
nine test board. The speciﬁc tests employed in each case are
described individually in the ‘‘Results’’ section, but every error event
detected was automatically veriﬁed in real-time by performing
multiple readbacks from the hardware to collect information
associated with the SEU event, and checking it for consistency in
the software. For example, errors in the Block RAMs (programmed
as ROMs) usually involved one or more bit ﬂips, and in these cases
the memory was read back again to conﬁrm that there was bad data
in the memory, and not a transmission error. All the information
about each SEU event was saved in a log ﬁle for later review,
including a time stamp, the error data, what the data should have
been, and which test condition was activated by the SEU.
4.2. Non-digital components
There are several non-digital components required in the new
CSC electronics, such as voltage regulators and diodes which are
Fig. 3. Top-side view of a TMB mezzanine test board, as used in SEU tests for digital components.
Fig. 4. One of the voltage regulator test boards that was exposed to 1 MeV
neutrons in the TAMU NSC reactor.
Fig. 5. Diagram of the test circuits used on the TMB mezzanine test boards,
indicating the ﬁve digital devices tested in the TAMU cyclotron.
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designed voltage regulator test boards were assembled (Fig. 4) for
testing the performance of multiple samples for each component.
Based on the radiation exposure calculations for HL-LHC, the
electronics mounted on ME1/1 chambers must withstand 1 MeV
neutron ﬂuence of 3 1012 cm2 and about 9 krad total dose over
10 years. To account for the uncertainties in these calculations, a
safety factor of three times the expected levels was imposed, and
these radiation tests extend beyond 30 krad.
The Texas A&M Nuclear Science Center supports a 1 MW
TRIGA reactor that serves as an ideal environment to determine
those parts which are suitable for use in the CSC electronics
project. The voltage regulator test boards received an initial
exposure for 1 h at 6 kW reactor power, with a 1 MeV neutron
ﬂux of 9:9 108 cm2 s1; a few weeks later they were exposed
for an additional 2 h at same reactor power. The accumulated
radiation exposure levels correspond to 10 and 30 HL-LHC years,
respectively (approximately 10 krad and 30 krad), and the total
neutron ﬂuence was 10:7 1012 cm2.5. Results
This section provides a description for each type of component
tested and explains the procedures used to carry out the tests in
each case; an overview of the test conﬁguration used for the
digital components is shown in Fig. 5. For the non-digital parts,
each was tested with dedicated load resistors tuned to emulate
the realistic conditions for normal CMS operation. Results are
presented for SEU susceptibility and radiation survivability, based
on measurements such as SEU counts, voltage levels, total ﬂuence
and the dose during each exposure.
It was noted that a few SEUs were observed in the FPGA during
exposure of other components, likely caused by backscatter from
the beam. These kinds of SEUs were clearly distinguished in the
error monitoring system and they were allocated to the appro-
priate SEU category. Furthermore, the rate of these was very low,
causing less than 1% of all SEUs, so the overall impact on the SEU
test results is negligible.
Power supply currents were monitored during exposure and no
changes were observed, which is evidence that no latchup occurred
in this study.
5.1. Snap12 receiver/transmitter: Reﬂex Photonics SN-R12-C00501/
T12-C00501
The Snap12 transmitter and receiver are used to transfer data
through 12 independent optical channels. For the model tested,
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ﬁber optic cable at a wavelength of 850 nm. The transmitter
converts 12 electrical signals into ﬁber optic signals, while the
receiver performs reversed conversion. In most cases, the new
CSC electronics will not utilize all 12 of these links; only 6 were
tested on each board in this test.
During the test, the FPGA was programmed to use a Pseudo-
Random Bit Generator (PRBG) to create randomized data, and
transmit the data at 3.2 Gb/s through the Snap12 devices. The
Snap12 ﬁbers were physically looped-back from the output
(transmit) port to an input (receive) port with a 15 m long MTP
ﬁber ribbon cable. The FPGA received the data and checked for
differences against what was sent; six such ﬁber circuits were
operated in parallel for this test. Any discrepancy between
transmitted and received data was identiﬁed as an SEU, and a
count was made of such occurrences. These counts were read out
from the FPGA via a gigabit Ethernet (GbE) link to a PC and
monitored by software at 1 s intervals. Software recorded time
stamp information associated with each incremental error.
Test results for Snap12 receiver and transmitter are shown in
Table 2. The typical SEU failure mode was due to bit errors in a
single data word. In HL-LHC these transient errors will occur at a
low rate, with only about one per week on each receiver channel
and almost zero errors from the transmitters, so no mitigation is
needed for the Snap12 components.5.2. Optical transceiver: Finisar FTLF8524E2GNL
Optical transceivers are used to build high-speed data links
over multi-mode ﬁber optics. The Finisar component selected for
the new electronics is bidirectional and can operate at rates up to
4.25 Gb/s.
For radiation testing, the FPGA was programmed to send GbE
packets carrying randomized data through the Finisar. The ﬁber
was physically connected to a commercial PCI gigabit Ethernet
card in the test control PC, and the data packet integrity was
tested using a cyclic redundancy check [8]. After each packet was
checked, a new packet was transmitted. Any discrepancy between
transmitted and received data packets was considered an SEU,
and such error instances were counted.
In cases of persistent error the test operator issued a system
reset; if not resolved by a reset, the operator turned off the power
supply for 5 s, then resumed testing. A power cycle was required a
total of eight times due to the loss of the data link on the
Tx channel. No change in current was observed, so an SEU in
the transmit enable circuit seems the likely cause rather than
latchup. The cross-section of this occurrence is 5:9 1011 cm2
which corresponds to about 1.5 times per year for each Finisar
component during real operations at CMS. While this rate is
acceptable for use in the new system, it will be investigatedTable 2
Number of SEUs observed for each component during proton irradiation and the resulti
operation for each device if no mitigation is implemented.
Component tested Board 1 Board 2
SEU s ð1011 cm2Þ SEU s ð10
Finisar 6 873 8 1375
Snap12 Tx 6 973 3 673
Snap12 Rx 278 850750 311 7907
TI Level Shifter 0 o4:0 0 o3:0
FPGA-GTX 52 80710 39 7071
FPGA-CLB 40 38007600 22 36007
FPGA-Bram 61 58007700 34 55007further in a future study to verify the cause of the problem and to
establish a reliable mechanism for mitigation.
The test result summary for the Finisar is shown in Table 2.
However, deeper analysis of the errors shows that the rate of SEU
induced bit errors scales with the rate of packets transmitted on
the GbE link. Rescaling this SEU cross-section for the worst-case
data load expected at HL-LHC increases it to 4:5 108 cm2
which corresponds to about seven errors per day on each link
during real operation at CMS. This is less than the typical industry
standard for bit errors on gigabit links of one error per 10 trillion
bits, and such low rate of transient bit errors is acceptable in CMS
with no need for mitigation.5.3. Bus exchange level shifter: Texas Instruments SN74CB3T16212
While newer electronics used for the CSC project rely on 2.5 V
technology, they must also communicate with some older 3.3 V
components in the system. This is a concern for the Virtex 6 FPGA
which is limited to 2.5 V signal levels. To keep the chip safe, the
voltage level of the incoming signals to the FPGA must be reduced
to 2.5 V using the TI level shifter.
To test these chips for SEU susceptibility, the FPGA was
programmed to transmit randomized data patterns through the
DUT. A set of outgoing FPGA data lines were electrically looped
back into the level shifter input port using a customized circuit
board. The data then passed from the level shifter to the FPGA,
where it was checked for differences against what was sent. As
each received word was checked, a new word was transmitted, at
80 MHz clock frequency. As above, any discrepancy between
transmitted and received data words was identiﬁed as an SEU;
the FPGA counted such instances in an internal register, which
was accessed at 1 s intervals via GbE link to a PC. Software
recorded the time stamp and other information associated with
each error. Since no errors were observed, the test results shown
in Table 2 are the upper limits on the SEU cross-section at 90%
conﬁdence level.5.4. Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA: XC6V195T-2FFG1156CES
Virtex 6 is one of the most advanced FPGAs available, containing
many specialized built-in-silicon modules, and it requires several
voltage supplies to operate, ranging from 1.0 V to 2.5 V. Having more
logic resources than previous models, this FPGA is capable of
processing data more efﬁciently. It also has dedicated memory blocks
and multi-gigabit transceiver ‘‘GTX’’ blocks. Using the TAMU cyclo-
tron, two Virtex-6 chips were tested and the results for the embedded
silicon modules are indicated in Table 2. The FPGA ﬁrmware design
for these tests utilized 11 out of 20 GTX blocks, 74% of the Block
RAMs, and 38% of the FPGA Conﬁgurable Logic Blocks (CLBs). In order
to measure the maximum level of FPGA sensitivity to SEUs, no SEUng cross-sections. The last column shows the expected rate of SEUs during HL-LHC
Average savg ð1011 cm2Þ Expected SEU rate at CMS
11 cm2Þ
1073 3/year/chip
772 o1/year/link
50 820730 4/month/link
o1:7 0
0 7678 3/year/link
800 37007500 6/day/chip
900 57007600 9/day/chip
Fig. 6. Examples of voltage regulator output stability after each radiation
exposure, showing the change in voltage output for regulators that survived the
full exposure level. After each exposure the output voltages were measured under
power at 30 min intervals. Voltage regulator deviations greater than 5% are not
acceptable for CSC electronics.
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was counted as an SEU, regardless of the mechanism causing it.5
The FPGA CLBs and Block RAM memories were conﬁgured as
ROMs and preloaded with known sets of randomized data. These
ROMs were repeatedly read out to a PC using a GbE link, and data
checks were performed in software. Discrepancies found in the
data were identiﬁed as SEUs; the software saved the information
associated with each error in a log ﬁle (including time stamp, the
identity of the wrong bits and the raw data itself) and notiﬁed the
test operator that a system reset was required to recover the
corrupted ROM. Resets were controlled manually by push button.
The FPGA GTX tests occurred in parallel with FPGA logic and
memory testing6 during FPGA proton beam exposure. Custom
error monitoring tools were used to independently track the
different types of errors. Test results for all of the Virtex-6 FPGA
components are shown in Table 2.
Analysis of the recorded SEU events showed that in most cases,
the observed Block RAM errors differed from the original pre-
loaded patterns by a single bit. In cases with differences in more
that one bit, the corruption could be attributed to the inversion of
a single bit in the logic fabric of the FPGA used for Block RAM
control.
The measured GTX error rate is relatively low, with only three
transient errors expected per year on each link at HL-LHC, so no
dedicated mitigation is required for these elements of the FPGA.
However, the Block RAM and CLB logic error rate is signiﬁcant,
with several errors expected per chip every day. Block RAM errors
can be mitigated using the error detection and correction features
embedded in the FPGA. CLB logic errors must be mitigated by
implementing triple module redundancy, where voting is used to
correct bit errors. The effectiveness of these methods is to be
tested in a future study.
5.5. Voltage regulators
Eleven different voltage regulator models from ﬁve different
manufacturers were mounted on custom-designed voltage reg-
ulator test boards (Fig. 4). The boards were placed in the large-
sample irradiation chamber, and they were not powered during
exposure. The voltage, current and temperature performance of
each circuit was tested before and after each exposure in order to
determine their radiation tolerance. At least two samples of each
regulator were tested, and consistent pattern was observed in the
results.
In Fig. 6, a representative sample of results from ﬁve different
regulators is shown. The vertical axis represents the ratio of the
measured voltage (after exposure) to the pre-exposure voltage;
the horizontal axis shows the measurements taken in 30-min
time intervals after each radiation exposure. Observing a constant
result with value  1 over time indicates that the regulator is a
stable, reliable choice for our design. As seen from the ﬁgure,
several regulators break down after exposure and fail to regulate;
some of the samples perform well after the ﬁrst 10 krad exposure,
and then fail after the ﬁnal 20 krad exposure. Some chips show a
small degree of recovery over time, but they remain outside of the
acceptable performance range of 75% voltage variation.
Three of the six Max8557ETE regulators showed 0 V output
after the second exposure, while the other three show approxi-
mately 3% decrease in voltage. This is the only observed case of
complete failure for a regulator due to radiation. Several other5 There is no distinction made between SEUs in the logic fabric and the
conﬁguration memory of the FPGA; any error detected in FPGA function is counted
as an SEU.
6 These are separate test modules in the ﬁrmware operating simultaneously in
the FPGA, and the errors for each are tracked individually.regulators showed more than 5% change in voltage, and regard-
less of the mechanism, these are all unacceptable for use in CSC
electronics.
The following regulator models demonstrated performance
degradation to varying degrees and do not show the tolerance
required for use in CMS:SEU
canMaxim 8557ETE (p);
 Sharp PQ05VY053ZZH, PQ035ZN1H2PH, and PQ070XZ02ZPH;
 TI TPS75601KTT (p) and TPS75901 (p).
where (p) indicates parts manufactured with p-channel MOSFETs.
About half of the tested regulator models showed no signiﬁ-
cant change in performance, and these voltage regulators were
determined to be suitable for use in the new CSC electronics7: National Semi LP38501-ADJ (n) and LP38853S-ADJ (n);
 TI TPS74901KTWR (n);
 MIC69502WR and MIC49500WU.where (n) indicates parts manufactured with n-channel MOSFETs.
This reduced set of suitable candidates will undergo further
testing in the future to verify their tolerance to SEUs and
cumulative effects under power.5.6. ST Micro and ON Semi diodes: 1N5819
The CSC low voltage supply system utilizes 1N5819 diodes for
power supply protection, and these need testing just as the other
silicon components. Ten samples of these diodes from two
different manufacturers were tested in conjunction with the
voltage regulator tests. Performance testing was done before
and after each exposure. The performance validation circuit used7 The initial sample size of regulators was too broad for efﬁcient evaluation of
tolerance at the TAMU cyclotron, but this will be addressed for the surviving
didates in a future study.
Table 3
Average measurements of the forward diode voltages before and after each
exposure.
Manufacturer PRE RAD. Vfwd ðVÞ POST RAD. I Vfwd ðVÞ POST RAD. II Vfwd ðVÞ
ST Micro 0.413 0.421 0.413
ON Semi 0.391 0.395 0.388
B. Bylsma et al. / Nuclear Instruments and Methods in Physics Research A 698 (2013) 242–248248a 7.67 V DC supply with a series resistor of 7:5 O that was
connected through the diode to ground. Each diode test consisted
of two trials: one with forward bias and another with reverse bias.
A small voltage drop across each diode was observed in the
forward trials, as shown in Table 3; in the reverse direction there
was zero current through the circuit. All diodes showed consis-
tent diode properties after neutron irradiation, with essentially no
degradation from the radiation.6. Conclusion
Several COTS components planned for use in the CSC electro-
nics project were tested at the TAMU Cyclotron Institute and the
TAMU Nuclear Science Center reactor. Radiation tolerant power
handling components were identiﬁed that are likely to be suitable
for use in the CMS Endcap Muon system. Some unsuitable
components were also identiﬁed during these tests.
SEU susceptibility was measured for several digital compo-
nents. The results show that most of these parts will not need SEUmitigation in the CMS endcap environment during HL-LHC
operation; however, the need for mitigation was identiﬁed for
the logic and memory elements in the Xilinx Virtex-6 FPGA.Acknowledgments
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